In a competitive environment, the definition of an effective strategy for the development of a company acquires great importance and is impossible without the use of mathematical modeling methods. The article proposes a hierarchically organized model of an IT enterprise. The consideration was carried out on the example of Electronic Medicine LLC. The Cobb-Douglas production function is used to describe the firm's activities. Numerical calculations are made by simulation for real input data. The Stackelberg equilibrium is constructed, and the results obtained are analyzed.

Keywords: hierarchical modeling, Stackelberg equilibrium, Cobb-Douglas production function, simulation

The article considers the task of combating the opportunistic behavior of a supervisor and agents in a river water quality control system. A three-level hierarchical model is being built, including the principal, supervisor and agent. Each of the entities seeks to maximize its objective function. The motivation method is used as a control method at both levels. The behavior of the system in the case of information regulations of the Stackelberg game is investigated. The substantiation of the derivation of functions used in the model is given. The results of model simulation under various initial conditions are demonstrated. An analysis of the results is given.

Keywords: Stackelberg balance, three-level system, motivation, imitation, opportunistic behavior, river water quality, hierarchy

The article deals with the task of dealing with the opportunistic behavior of the supervisor and agents in the river water quality control system. A two-level hierarchical model is built, including a supervisor (master) and agents (slaves). Each of the subjects seeks to maximize their objective function. In the model, the principal is implicitly present, fighting against the opportunistic behavior of the supervisor and agents. As the method of control used the method of inducement. The behavior of the system is investigated in the case of Shtakelberg’s information regulations. The algorithm for finding the Stackelberg equilibrium is indicated. The results of model simulation under various initial conditions are demonstrated. An analysis of the results is provided.

Keywords: Shtakelberg equilibrium, two-level system, prompting, imitation, opportunistic behavior, river water quality, hierarchy