Opportunistic behavior of subjects in three-level control systems and methods of dealing with it
Abstract
Opportunistic behavior of subjects in three-level control systems and methods of dealing with it
Incoming article date: 20.05.2020The article considers the task of combating the opportunistic behavior of a supervisor and agents in a river water quality control system. A three-level hierarchical model is being built, including the principal, supervisor and agent. Each of the entities seeks to maximize its objective function. The motivation method is used as a control method at both levels. The behavior of the system in the case of information regulations of the Stackelberg game is investigated. The substantiation of the derivation of functions used in the model is given. The results of model simulation under various initial conditions are demonstrated. An analysis of the results is given.
Keywords: Stackelberg balance, three-level system, motivation, imitation, opportunistic behavior, river water quality, hierarchy