Finding the Stackelberg equilibrium in the model of development of the subsidized region. The impact of coalition building
Abstract
Finding the Stackelberg equilibrium in the model of development of the subsidized region. The impact of coalition building
Incoming article date: 12.04.2025The article examines the network model of district management within the subsidized region from the point of view of the upper level, taking into account the optimal response of the districts – the Stackelberg equilibrium is found. The results obtained are compared with the corresponding results in the creation of horizontal and integrated coalitions of districts and the region. The author examines the preference for creating coalitions for all participants in the system. It has been proven that cooperation is more profitable for weak and medium-sized districts, hierarchy is more profitable for a strong district, and independence is more profitable for the region as for the upper level. It is not profitable for the strong elements of the system to join a coalition, while it is more profitable for the weak elements to join a coalition.
Keywords: network model, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium, resource allocation, Lagrange multiplier method, cooperation, horizontal coalition, maximal coalition, complex coalition, independent behavior